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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BASIN FLYING SERVICE,
Protestant-Appellant,
vs.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION,
DINALAND AVIATION, INCORPORATED and FLAMING GORGE
FLYING SERVICE,
Respondents-Appellees.

Case No.
13735

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
FLAMING GORGE FLYING SERVICE

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an order of the Public Service
Commission of Utah which ruled that the non-scheduled
intrastate air carrier service offered by appellee Dinaland
Aviation was not subject to regulation by that Commission.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Public Service Commission ruled appellee Dinaland Aviation's non-scheduled air carrier service could
not be regulated by the Commission.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks to have the order of the Public
Service Commission reversed and have this court hold
that all intrastate air carriers are subject to regulation
by the Public Service Commission.
FACTS
Prior to October 1973, the Public Service Commission of Utah (hereinafter referred to as Commission)
served upon appellee Dinaland Aviation (hereinafter referred to as Dinaland) an Order to Show Cause why it
shouldn't be required to obtain a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity from the Commission in order to
continue its business. In conjunction therewith, an Order
to Show Cause was also issued by the Commission against
appellee Flaming Gorge Flying Service (hereafter Flaming Gorge), ordering it to show cause why action should
not be taken against it for alleged misuse of the Certificate of Convenience and Necessity which it holds under
the authority of the Commission.
Dinaland filed an application for a Certificate of
Convenience and Necessity which contained a prayer and
allegation asking that the Commission find itself without
authority to regulate the charter service engaged in by it,
which consists of air taxi service over irregular routes at
irregular times on an on-call basis. Flaming Gorge conducts a similar type of business, and both appellees operate in the Northeastern Utah area.
Both matters were consolidated for hearing, and on
December 13, 1973, the Order to Show Cause which had
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issued against Flaming Gorge was dismissed for lack of
evidence. However, Flaming Gorge was given leave to
continue its appearance in this matter with regard to the
question of the Commission's authority to regulate the
particular type of charter service offered by Flaming
Gorge and Dinaland.
Basin Flying Service (hereinafter referred to as Basin)
entered an appearance as a protestant to Dinaland's application at this hearing, and the matter of the application
of Dinaland was continued without date with the Commission taking under advisement the following two issues, as stated on page 2 of the Commission's Investigation Docket No. 151, Report and Order, dated April 25,
1974:
(1) Whether this Commission has jurisdiction to regulate the service provided by respondent, Dinaland Aviation Incorporated, on March
8,1973; and
(2) If this Commission has jurisdiction,
whether Dinaland Aviation Incorporated violated
the laws of the State of Utah and the rules and
regulations of this Commission in regard to the
service performed by said respondent on March
8,1973.
The service performed on March 8, 1973, to which
the Commission refers is described on page 2 of the Commission's Report and Order of April 25, 1974, as follows:
2. On March 8, 1973, respondent provided
a non-scheduled charter flight from Vernal, Utah
Airport to Salt Lake City, Utah transporting for
hire a member of the general public.

3 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Commission's Report and Order of April 25,
1974, held that the Commission did not have jurisdiction
to regulate the service provided by Dinaland, and that
the proceeding should be dismissed with prejudice. (Report and Order of April 25,1974, p. 5).
A petition for rehearing was filed by Basin, and was
denied by order of the Commission dated June 26, 1974.
Following an appeal to this court, a motion for dismissal
was then made by Dinaland on October 21, 1974, which
motion was denied.

ARGUMENT
POINT I: THE FINDINGS OF THE PUBLIC
SERVICE COMMISSION ARE PRESUMED
VALID AND CORRECT AND THIS COURT
MUST SURVEY THE EVIDENCE IN THE
LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO SUSTAINING THOSE FINDINGS.
Section 54-7-16 U.C.A. (1953), provides in part when
defining the jurisdiction of this court to hear appeals
from decisions of the Commission:
. . . The review {by the Supreme Court} shall
not be extended further than to determine whether
the Commission has regularly pursued its authority, including a determination of whether the order
or decision under review violates any right of the
petitioner under the Constitution of the United
States or of the State of Utah.
In the recent case of Lewis v. Wycoff Co., 18 Utah
2d 255, 420 P.2d 264 (1966), this court was asked on

4
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appeal to reverse an order of the Commission which
granted an increase in the authority of Wycoff, as a common carrier, to include emergency shipments of contractors' supplies between all points in Utah. In affirming the Commission's ruling, this court stated:
Due to the responsibility imposed upon the
Commission and its presumed knowledge and expertise in this field, its findings and order are
supported by certain well-recognized rules of review. They are endorsed with a presumption of
validity and correctness; and the burden is upon
the plaintiff to show that they are in error. We
survey the evidence in the light most favorable
to sustaining them; and we will not reverse unless
there is no reasonable basis therein to support
them so that it appears that the Commission's action was capricious and arbitrary. (420 P.2d at p.
266).
See also Salt Lake Transfer Co. v. Public Service
Commission, 11 U.2d 121, 355 P.2d 706 (I960), and
Union Pac. R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 102
Utah 465, 132 P.2d 128 (1942).
The Commission in the instant case concluded that
Dinaland was a non-scheduled air carrier and as such
was not subject to the authority of the Commission. Ample
evidence to support this finding exists in the Record on
Appeal, and since Utah law clearly requires this conclusion to be surveyed in a light most favorable to sustaining it, this is not an appropriate case for overturning the
Commission's findings.

5
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POINT II: APPELLEE DINALAND AVIATION INCORPORATED IS NOT A SCHEDULED AIR CARRIER.
The appellant has failed to discuss thoroughly the
issue of what exactly makes a carrier "scheduled" or
"non-scheduled", although in both Points I and II of its
brief it has touched upon this issue somewhat. Since
whether or not the Appellees are scheduled or non-scheduled carriers is basic to a decision in this matter, the
issue deserves some attention.
In Thompson v. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New
York, 148 N.E. 2d 9, cert, denied, 358 U.S. 837, 79 S.Ct.
62, 3 L.Ed.2d 74 (111. 1958), the plaintiff, beneficiary of
an insurance policy taken out by her deceased husband
who had died in an airplane crash brought suit against
the defendant insurance company when they refused to
pay on the policy. The defendant contended at trial that
its policy covered the deceased only if he was flying on
a "scheduled air carrier", and the plaintiff argued in
turn that the deceased had been on such an air carrier
at the time of his death. The facts showed that the deceased had been flying on a plane owned by Peninsular
Air Transport Company, a partnership which operated
four aircraft. Peninsular did not maintain scheduled
flights, file schedules or tariffs for any regular passenger service, and did not hold itself out as maintaining
any regular schedule of flights. The aircraft in question
had flown from Miami, Florida to Richmond, Virginia
on November 13 (the crash occurred on November 17),
and from that point proceeded with passengers to Tacoma, Washington. From there, it flew to Seattle, where
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it stayed until the 17th in order to obtain some passengers for a flight. On November 17, the plane left Seattle
carrying military troops who were all individually ticketed passengers, and at this time crashed on takeoff, killing plaintiff's decedent. On the date of the crash, Peninsular had no regularly scheduled flights from Seattle to
any other point in the United States.
The trial court granted plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence, and from
the judgment entered upon such verdict the defendant
appealed. The appellate court reversed, ruling that a
directed verdict should have been entered for the defendant on the grounds that Peninsular was not a scheduled
aircraft carrier. The court stated in the course of its
opinion:
There is nothing ambiguous about the term
scheduled air carrier. This term has a clear and
concise meaning and when defined by any standard it simply denotes an air carrier which operates and holds itself out to the public that it does
operate aircraft designated points regularly, or
with a reasonable degree of regularity, pursuant
to a scheduled previously announced. We are
not unmindful of the fact that words have meanings and different significations to different people
on different occasions or under various and different circumstances, but we cannot perceive how
the term scheduled air carrier can have other than
one meaning; that being an air carrier which operates aircraft between designated points regularly in accordance with previously announced
schedules. (148 N.E.2d at p. 15).
In Eveready Freight Service, Inc. v. Public Utilities
Comm., 449 P.2d 642 (Colo. 1969), the plaintiff Eveready
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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filed an application with the Colorado Public Service
Commission, stating a rate for the transportation of sodium
silicate from Climax, Colorado to Urad, Colorado. Denver-Climax Truck Lines, Inc., intervened, protesting that
Eveready's Certificate of Convenience and Necessity contained a provision which prohibited Eveready from competing with "scheduled operations of presently existing"
carriers. Eveready contended that Denver-Climax was not
engaged in scheduled operations, but the Commission ruled
in favor of Denver-Climax, holding that it was a "scheduled line haul common carrier." Eveready appealed to the
Colorado Supreme Court, and the court reversed the Commission's decision, saying:
The Commission's finding that Denver-Climax is
a scheduled line haul common carrier is not the
same as a finding that Denver-Climax is conducting scheduled operations within the meaning of
the Eveready's Certificate. (449 P.2d at p. 643).
The court continued:
It seems clear to us that any definition of scheduled operations must entail the concept of service
on a regular time schedule previously announced
as to time of departure and arrival between definitely established points regardless of whether
there are passengers or freight to be carried. (449
P.2d at p. 644).
Clearly Dinaland's operation is not that of a scheduled carrier; it publishes no schedviles, does not fly regular
routes pursuant to pre-published schedules, and certainly
does not fly planes without payloads. Persons may charter
a plane and set a definite departure time for that particular
flight, but Dinaland runs no regular route between defi-
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nite points by any stretch of the imagination. Dinaland's
planes do not fly unless someone has hired one of them
for a particular job, and then the planes go when and
where the customer desires. A more classic example of a
non-scheduled carrier, according to both legal precedent
and common sense, is difficult to imagine.

POINT

III

THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION IS
W I T H O U T AUTHORITY T O REGULATE
APPELLEE DINALAND AVIATION INCORPORATED AND OTHER NON-SCHEDULED AIR CARRIERS.
Chapter 4 of Title 54, U.C.A. (1953), grants the
Commission authority over public utilities operating in
Utah. The general jurisdiction of the Commission is stated
in Section 54-4-1, which states:
General jurisdiction — The Commission is hereby
vested with power and jurisdiction to supervise
and regulate every public utility in this state, and
to supervise all of the business of every such public utility in this state, and to do all things, whether herein specifically designated, or in addition
thereto, which are necessary or convenient in the
exercise of such power and jurisdiction. (Emphasis
added.)
Section 54-2-1(30), U.C.A. (1953) defines "public
utility" as follows:
The term public utility includes every common
carrier, gas corporation, electrical corporation, telephone corporation, telegraph corporation, water
corporation, sewerage corporation, heat corpora9
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tion and warehouseman where the service is performed for, or the commodity delivered to, the
public generally, . . . (Emphasis added).
Section 54-2-1(14) defines common carrier as follows:
The term common carrier includes every railroad
corporation; street railroad corporation; automobile corporation; scheduled aircraft carrier (corporation); aerial bucket tramway corporation; express corporation; dispatch sleeping, dining, drawing-room, freight, refrigerator, oil stock and fruit
car corporation; freight line, car loaning, car renting, car loading and every other car corporation;
and person; . . . (Emphasis added).
Finally, Section 54-2-1(29) defines aircraft carrier:
The term aircraft carrier includes every corporation and person and lessee, trustee and receivers or
trustees appointed by any court whatsoever, operating for public service for hire engaged in intrastate
transportation of persons or property; except those
air carriers operating with a certificate of convenience and necessity issued by the federal government.
Even though the term "aircraft carrier" is broad
enough as defined under Utah law to include Dinaland,
the legislature included in the definition of common carrier only scheduled air carriers. This definition then does
not include Dinaland, a non-scheduled carrier, and since
it is not a common carrier, then it can't be a public utility,
and since the Commission may regulate only public utilities, it follows that Dinaland may not be regulated at all
by the Commission.

10J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Appellant devotes a substantial portion of its brief
(Point I, pp. 7-9) to citing cases, none of them from Utah,
which define and discuss the term "common carrier." Such
argument is not relevant to the issues of the instant case,
since Section 54-2-1(14) provides a statutory definition
of this term, and the decisions of other jurisdictions on
the point of the definition of the term common carrier
are not helpful in the fact of a particular Utah statute
which provides a definition for the phrase as it is used in
conjunction with the authority of the Commission.
The real crux of the instant appeal is not an argument
over the definition of "common carrier", but may more
accurately be characterized as a conflict between two
statutes, 54-2-1(14) (supra) and 54-4-25, both of which
were amended in 1969. Section 54-4-25 is the specific
statute providing for issuance of Certificates of Convenience and Necessity by the Commission and reads in part
as follows:
54-4-25. Certificates of Convenience and Necessity prerequisite to construction and operation —
Certificates issued to electrical corporations brought
under act — Aircraft Carriers. — (1) No railroad
corporation, street railroad corporation, aerial
bucket tramway corporation, gas corporation, electric corporation, telephone corporation, telegraph
corporation, heat corporation, automobile corporation, aircraft carrier (corporation), water corporation or sewage corporation shall henceforth
establish, or begin construction or operation of a
railroad, street railroad, aerial bucket tramway,
line, route, plant or system or any extension of
such railroad, street railroad, aerial bucket tramway line, route, plant or system without having
first obtained from the Commission a certificate
11
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that present or future public convenience and
necessity does or will require such construction;
. . . (Emphasis added).
The appellee, in Point II of its brief, argues that this
statute, which does not use the phrase f 'scheduled aircraft
carrier," requires all aircraft carriers to obtain Certificates of Convenience and Necessity. Such reasoning is
faulty for two reasons: (1) it is contrary to the statutory
scheme of Title 54 and the intent of the Utah legislature;
and (2) non-scheduled air carriers are not subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission by operation of Sections
54-4-1, 54-2-1(30) and 54-2-1(14).
The legislature did not intend that the Commission
regulate non-scheduled air carriers. Title 54 of the Utah
Code Annotated was amended in 1969 by House Bill 244,
passed during the 1969 Regular Session of the Utah State
Legislature. This bill, as noted by appellant in Point II
of its brief, was an act amending Sections 54-2-1 and 544-25 of the Utah Code, adding aircraft carriers to the list
of entities regulated by the Commission. As the act was
originally written and introduced, it covered all air carriers, but it was amended on the floor upon its third and
final reading immediately prior to its passage in the House
by the insertion of the word f 'scheduled'' in what is now
Section 54-2-1(14). The Journal of the House of Representatives, State of Utah, 1969 Session, p. 831, reads in
part as follows:
H.B. No. 244 read the third time in full and placed
on its final passage. On motion of Representative
Darger, the report of the Committee on Business
and Commerce with respect to H.B. No. 244 was
adopted.
12
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On motion of Representative Reese, the bill [H.B.
244} was amended as follows:
Page 3, line 33, after the words automobile corporation; insert the word scheduled.
*

#

#

*

H.B. No. 244 as amended, then passed on the following roll call. . . .
A copy of H.B. 244 is included in the record, and it
should be noted that the amendment on page 3 thereof
altered what is now Section 54-2-1(14). An amendment
to Section 54-4-25 to include aircraft carriers in the group
of entities which must acquire Certificates of Convenience
and Necessity was also part of the original H.B. 244, but
this section was not amended on the floor. This failure to
change what is now Section 54-4-25 at the time that Section 54-2-1(14) was amended on the floor of the house is
the basic cause of this entire lawsuit, since Section 54-2-1(14) following the floor amendment, refers to "scheduled"
air carriers only in defining the term common carrier,
while Section 54-4-25 refers to all air carriers in requiring
Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity.
No record exists of any discussions by members of
the 1969 legislature regarding H. B. 244, but two of the
sponsors of this bill filed affidavits with the Commission
concerning the "legislative intent" in passing this bill,
which affidavits are included in the record on pages 81
and 82. These affidavits, one filed by D. Leon Reese, the
man who made the floor amendment adding the word
"scheduled", and the other by Richard Carling, a co-sponsor of H.B. 244, both indicate that the intent of the floor
13
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

amendment was to limit the coverage of H.B. 244 to
scheduled air carriers only, and the failure to so amend
what is now Section 54-4-25 by adding the word "scheduled" was merely an oversight.
In addition to the fact that the legislative intent in
passing House Bill 244 was to regulate only scheduled
air carriers, even without knowing the intent of the legislature it is apparent that non-scheduled air carriers are
not subject to the authority of the Commission. The Public Service Commission's powers are granted by statute,
and no expansion of those powers beyond the particular
limitations of the jurisdictional statute is permissible. 1
Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law, Section 70, states in
part as follows:
Administrative agencies are creatures of statute
and their power is dependent upon statutes, so that
they must find within the statute warrant for the
exercise of any authority which they claim.
Section 54-4-1, U.C.A., is the broad, general grant
of power to the Commission and vests the Commission with
power over "public utilities. ,, As appellant has pointed
out earlier in this brief, public utilities include common
carriers, but common carriers do not include non-scheduled aircraft carriers. Section 54-4-25, by requiring certificates of convenience and necessity of all aircraft carriers, cannot expand the basic jurisdiction of the P.S.C.
where Section 54-4-1 does not grant such jurisdiction in
the first place. The P.S.C. may obtain jurisdiction only by
statute, and if the basic jurisdiction does not exist, a specific statute requiring a certain act may not confer such
jurisdiction. In other words, Section 54-4-25 does not

u
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grant jurisdiction; it only provides that certain entities
must perform a particular act. The statute which grants
jurisdiction, Section 54-4-1, does not by definition, grant
jurisdiction over non-scheduled carriers. Therefore, the
requirement that an entity over which the Commission
has no jurisdiction perform a certain act (i.e., obtain a
Certificate of Convenience and Necessity) is simply meaningless or at best unenforceable, since no power to regulate that entity in any way exists in the first place.
In addition to the fact that the Commission possesses
no basic grant of jurisdiction to regulate non-scheduled
air carriers in the first place, a careful reading of Section
54-4-25 indicates that Certificates of Convenience and
Necessity must be obtained by entities which engage in
scheduled, regular, consistent carriage of persons and
materials only. When surplus verbiage is deleted from
Section 54-4-25 and the relevant words of the statute stand
alone, the statute provides that:
N o . . . aircraft carrier (corporation) . . . shall
henceforth establish . . . [a} line, route . . . or
system or any extension [thereof] . . . without
having first obtained {a Certificate of Convenience
and Necessity}
The service provided by Dinaland could not be designated a "line" since this term, in the context of Section
54-4-25, clearly refers to such things as telephone lines,
pipelines and waterlines.
The term "system" is also inapplicable to non-scheduled air carriers since this word connotes a regular or
orderly setup of some sort; Dinaland's operation is completely irregular and it has no systematic procedure which
is followed.
15
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As for the word "route", it simply does not apply to
the flights made by non-scheduled air carriers. No definite
and regular routes are flown, and the distance and direction of each flight differs according to the desires of the
particular customer.
On the other hand, the words "route" and "system"
are very applicable to scheduled air carriers, since they do
indeed engage in systematic, orderly, regular flights following the same route, traveling to the same points, and
departing and arriving at the same times consistently.
Therefore, it is apparent that the intent of Section 54-4-25
was and is to regulate, aside from railroads, telephone,
telegraph, gas and electric companies, only those types
of entities which engage in providing regular, scheduled,
continuous service to the public, and not to regulate the
sporadic and unpredictable business of non-scheduled air
taxi service.
POINT IV
NON-SCHEDULED AIR CARRIERS IN UTAH
ARE SUBJECT TO SPECIFIC REGULATION
BY THE AERONAUTICS BOARD; REGULATION BY THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION WOULD BE DUPLICITOUS AND
WASTEFUL
Non-scheduled air carriers such as appellants will not
escape regulation by the State of Utah if the Commission
does not regulate them; the Utah State Aeronautics Board
exercises substantial control over such operations under
the authority of the Utah Aeronautical Regulatory Act,
(Title 2, Chapter 4, U.C.A. 1953).
16
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The Aeronautical Regulatory Act has, since 1961,
defined a "commercial flight operation" as "the carrying
of persons or goods for hire, including the conducting of
flight instruction for compensation." (Section 2-1-1(31),
U.C.A. 1953). Under the authority of this act, the Aeronautics Board has adopted regulations for all commercial
flight operators in Utah; appellants are subject to these
regulations in all respects. These regulations provide,
among other things, that flight operators are to register
annually with the Division of Aeronautics and are to carry
public liability and property damage insurance, including
coverage for aircraft passengers. All persons seeking to
engage in commercial flight operations in Utah are required to apply for and obtain a commercial operator's
certificate and meet the requirements of the above regulations.
To require non-scheduled air carriers to also obtain
certificates of convenience and necessity from another
regulatory agency like the Commission would result in unnecessary duplicity of government expense and regulation.

CONCLUSION
Respondent Flaming Gorge Flying Service has pointed out in this brief that Respondent Dinaland Aviation is a
non-scheduled air carrier and that, contrary to appellant's
assertions, this term does indeed have some specific legal
significance. Respondent has also shown that the 1969
Amendments to Title 54 of the Utah Code were intended
to subject only scheduled air carriers to the authority of
17
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the Public Service Commission, and therefore, Dinaland
Aviation is not required to obtain a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity from the Commission.
For these reasons, it is respectfully urged that this
court sustain the Findings of the Public Service Commission and hold that non-scheduled intrastate air carriers
are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT W. BRANDT
BRANDT, MILLER, NELSON
& CHRISTOPHERSON
716 Newhouse Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellee
Flaming Gorge Flying Service
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